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PETER SINGER, "ANIMALS AND THE VALUE
OF LIFE' IN MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH,
NEW INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS IN MORAL
~~ (NY: RANDOM HOUSE, INC,
1980) ,
In this essay, Singer attempts to de
determine one thing: the value of life.
Based on this determination, one can
conlcude what kinds of beings have
rights, and the kinds of rights they
have. Singer poses a preliminary
question: Is human life more valuable
than nonhuman life? Singer claims that
it is common for people to consider
human beings more valuable than non
nonhuman beings. But why is this so?
Is it because humans have capacities
greater than those of nonhumans?
It has been shown that chimpanzees,
and other mammals and birds, are
self-conscious, meaning that they are
able to reflect upon themselves as
existing in time, and plan for the
future, no matter how little advance in
the future they are planning. Singer
notes that these animals have the same
kind of capacities as human animals,
and some nonhuman animals even have some
capabilities which some humans do not
have. Hence, Singer claims that
some nonhuman animals are 'persons'.
This is an interesting and unique concept.
Generally, one tends to think of humans
as the only kind of animals who can be
persons, and oftentimes, people inter
interchange the terms 'human' and 'person'.
But Singer stresses the importance of this
distinction and bases his argument for
animal rights. and particularly in
defense of vegetarianism. on this claim.
Both preference utilitaridnism and
Tooley's argumentative view of rights l
stress the importance of being a per
person (that is, being aware of oneself
as existing over time). Hence, there
is no reason to assume that these rights
belong only to humans. Thus. the
replaceability principle, the principle
which states that the benefits gained
by one animal cancel out the loss they
inflict on another animal is not
applicable here." But Singer notes
that this does not resolve at least
one problem: the position in which
mentally deficient hu~an beings find
them~,-': 'les.
\~1ile Singer's article concerns only
the issue of killing animals and not the
issue of suffering. he is aware of this.
And although ~e includes in his essay
arguments concerning utilitarianism,
and though he briefly mentions the
'dominion theory'3, he gives specific
attention to arguments concerning
'intrinsic value'. Because of this
Singer fails adequately to discuss the
problems inherent within utilitarianism;
nor. does he resolve the problems within
Tooley's argument. Without an adequate
view of the status of human beings who
are comatose or mentally deficient, there
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remains a gap in the argument for animal
rights. For we must be able to know
what kinds of rights all animals deserve
in order to give certain other groups
any status. This problem, not a new
one, is considered to be indeterminable
by many theorists, especially writers on
abortion.
Despite the limitations of Singer's
argument, his view is interesting and
~orthy of consideration.
As an essay
~n an anthology, his position is
thorough and revelatory especially to
those whom are not familiar with the
subject-matter. His distinction
between 'human' and 'person' is inter
interesting and controversial. Whether or
not it is accurate remains to be seen.
lcf. Tooley, Michael. "A Defense
of Abortion and Infanticide" in
The Problem of Abortion, ed. by
joel Feinberg (CA: Wadsworth
1973).
'
2Singer, Peter. "Animals and
the Value of Life"; see p. 249-251.
3Ibid.; see p. 228-231. This
is the theory which states that
God gave human beings dominion over
other animals, for their own
purposes.
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